The Long War: Dispatch 3 -- The Unfolding Wars of the Littorals

Ricks argued that the “situation in Iraq is due to a breakdown in American governance,” not Iraqi governance. “Our system did not work as the founding fathers intended it to, during either the run-up to the invasion or the occupation.”

Instead Ricks believes that “the US had major failures in 5 different institutions,” noting that the “fiasco” described in his book has come, in his estimation from more than just a handful of public officials i.e. “the Bush administration, intelligence agencies, the press, the Congress, and the military establishment.”

Ricks then catalogued a series of errors and failures. He especially was critical of the failure of the US to understand Iraq culturally.

However, Ricks was magnanimous with praise toward those commanders whom he thought were exceptionally effective. He told a specific story about Col. H.R. McMaster, who upon taking command of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, visited every single one of units and told them face to face that if they disrespected Iraqis, then they were aiding the enemy. Upon arrival in Iraq, COL McMaster visited with sheiks and tribal leaders in his area of operations and told them, “When the American military first invaded Iraq, they were like men stumbling around furniture in a dark room. Now, the Iraqi government has turned on the lights for us, and the time for honorable resistance has ended.”

Ricks stated that this was the most polite way possible for McMaster to tell the Iraqis that if they didn’t stop what they were doing, McMaster would kill them.

Ricks then used this episode to elaborate on a larger point: The core value of Iraqi society is honor. “When Americans speak to the Iraqis about freedom, something is lost in translation.” But if as a society, we could somehow adapt the tone McMaster took in Tal Afar, it would be very productive.

“In conclusion, if we want to win, we must get the American system working,” he argued, noting again the five institutions that have failed.

In response to a questioner, Ricks noted that partition could easily kill tens of thousands of Iraqis, and that it could easily spill over into other countries and disrupt other security relationships and the global economy.

An enlisted Marine asked Ricks to clarify his comments about leadership failures in the military, and asked if he could elaborate on the hardworking nature and common sense of the troops. “Common sense translates least well into other cultures,” argued Ricks, stating that things the Iraqis consider perfectly normal, we would consider “nuts.”

Following lunch the second panel of the day, “The QDR Challenge: Balancing Assets Against Today’s Foes and Tomorrow’s Potential Adversaries” convened. Retired Colonel Robert O. Work, USMC, Senior Analyst for the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, moderated.

Work began by observing that not only was he fortunate to speak right after lunch, but the topic of budgeting and programming was certain to cause indigestion for most of the audience.

Panel participants were:
Rear Admiral Philip Hart Cullom, USN, Director for Strategy and Policy (N5SP);
Rear Admiral Dan W. Davenport, USN, Director, Assessment Division/Capability Analysis Group (OPNAV N81N00X); Director, Navy Quadrennial Defense Review;
Dr. Eric J. Labs, National Security Division, Congressional Budget Office; author of “A CBO Study: Options for the Navy’s Future, May 2006”;
Brigadier General Michael R. Regner, USMC, Deputy Director, Programming Division (N80B) OPNAV staff.

Admiral Cullom noted that the Navy must continue to be able to do its traditional missions while at the same time performing new roles related to the war on terror. He called specific attention to the idea of being predictable to our friends, but unpredictable to our adversaries.

General Regner wanted to jump back to a question asked of Mr. Ricks. The questioner had asked for one thing that the armed forces and the leadership had given to the United States: “If it was not for Captains and Marines present here, people like Mr. Ricks would not be able to do what they do.”

Regner went on to describe the nature of the QDR and the programming and budgetary aspects of the panel’s mission. “If you’re a company commander and you’re in Iraq and you need a special piece of equipment …” that request will rise through the chain and it will eventually be part of the plan in one way or another. “Every day you are deployed and at war, you are living through the precepts of the QDR.”

He listed several ways in which the Marine Corps has delineated issues it sees as paramount to continuing the fight and preparing for future fights. The Marine Corps is aggressively adapting to changes in warfare including sustainment of the force needed to meet operational demand, specifically, the need for 180,000 Marines, 5,000 more than is currently authorized in its end strength. A supplemental request will ask for 5,000 more Marines until the Iraqi forces are fully trained.

The General also specifically mentioned increasing the capability and capacity to conduct irregular warfare missions and the role of actionable intelligence in this regard. “The intent of the QDR is to provide actionable intelligence to the [military] men and women in the small villages [of Iraq] that make a difference on the ground.”

General Regner also made a point that other speakers had made, noting that the Marine Corps has started a Center for Advanced Operational Learning, to promote, among other things, cultural awareness. “If you go in and cannot speak the language, at least you might know the courtesies of the country.”

As to future fights, both within the current war, and beyond, he argued that “the nation’s most menacing future challenges are in the littorals. For most of the audience here today, your fight will be in the littorals.”

Dr. Labs noted that the Navy is perceived to be the least active service in the fights in Iraq and Afghanistan and asked “what must the Navy do? First, the Navy must develop a coherent message of its role in the war on terror.” Such a message might emphasize the roles of trade, integrated economies, and reliance on the world’s oceans. “Those forces that would seek to disrupt world trade,” and hurt the United States should be monitored, surveilled, and destroyed.

He described the effects of having a forward-deployed Navy all over the world. “Only the Navy provides the role of beat cop – that of community policeman that is so essential to stopping ‘crime.’”

As to future fights, “it is not a new cold war we face, but a potential great power rivalry, and the Navy will play a central role if not the central role in that conflict.” As to investing in future naval forces, he argued that “the Navy can be whittled away over a long period of time and we may find that when we need it the Navy is no longer there.”

General Regner advocated that as far as “after Iraq” goes, the US is moving toward seeing the Shia factions as a threat: Al Sadr, Iran, and Hezbollah.

A Navy Captain from the Naval Academy’s Political Science Department asked whether budgetary measurements weren’t using the wrong metric, noting that even though we spend more today now in total dollars, we spend much less as a percentage of GNP than we historically have in the post-World War II period.

Col. Work responded that the difference between then and now is the unprecedented deficits we anticipate after 2016, due to the aging of the baby boomers and their budget requirements.

Admiral Davenport noted that a big assumption for the Navy is that it will be able to control the costs of its platforms.

Much of the conversation revolved around the future of the LCS, or Littoral Combat Ship. An ongoing debate or sorts in Navy and Marine Corps circles is how many of these will be needed, how to pay for them, how many Marines they can hold, and so forth. An audience member raised an issue about the size and capacity of the flight decks on each of the ships, and how many helicopters each will hold.

This seemed a good example of Navy and Marine Corps cooperation: the decisions about how best to use these ships and so forth are economic decisions, but also have a large impact on the strategy and manning of both the Navy and Marine Corps. There seemed to be a genuine spirit of cooperation with regard to the teamwork required to resolve these difficult budget issues.