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October 24, 2006 11:56 AM
Ten Kilotons and the Port of Long Beach “60,000 killed instantly. The blast and subsequent fires might completely destroy the entire infrastructure and all ships in the Port of Long Beach and the adjoining Port of Los Angeles. Six million people might try to evacuate the Los Angeles region. Two to three million people might need relocation because fallout will have contaminated a 500 square kilometer area…. By Josh Manchester
A study recently released by the RAND Corporation examines the effects of a 10 kiloton nuclear blast on the Port of Long Beach. The study created a scenario and then used detailed scenario analysis to understand the effects of the blast within the first 72 hours the explosion. It then used strategic gaming (a different method of analysis) to examine the effects in the weeks and months afterwards. The study was performed by RAND with a number of representatives of the real estate and insurance industries as participants as well. In the scenario, “terrorists conceal a 10-kiloton nuclear weapon in a shipping container and ship it to the Port of Long Beach.” RAND’s conclusions are harrowing: Within the first 72 hours, the attack would devastate a vast portion of the Los Angeles metropolitan area. Because ground-burst explosions generate particularly large amounts of highly radioactive debris, fallout from the blast would cause much of the destruction. In some of the most dramatic possible outcomes:As far as the economic effects in the next weeks and months, RAND concludes that the economic costs would exceed $1 trillion (compared to 9/11, which cost $50-$100 billion) and that decision-makers would be faced with two very large issues: keeping the global shipping supply chain operating and restoring orderly economic relationships. Michael Wermuth, head of RAND’s Homeland Security Program, spoke with PajamasMedia and answered a few questions as to why Long Beach, and why this delivery method. He explained that the study “made no predictions about probabilities. If—and it is still a very big if—terrorists are ever able to acquire or build a device of this type, bringing it in through a port in a container is as plausible as any other method. Getting it out of a port to deliver it elsewhere would be more problematic. The venue could have been other places, but considering the amount of trade that flows through the Ports of LA and Long Beach, that site was chosen for that reason.” As to the development of the attack scenario and its aftermath, Wermuth noted that RAND “uses a lot of material in its research for such activities. We are, of course, aware of apocalyptic views and do not always agree with them, especially from the Hollywood viewpoint.” The RAND study is useful because it serves as a clarifying event: while the focus of the study was purely on economic effects, it raises many more questions in the realms of deterrence, non-proliferation, and national defense. Deterrence and Non-proliferation How does such a policy address the scenario in which a state cannot reliably store its own nuclear materials? If the state knew it was on the kill list, and could not store its materials securely, it might be extremely incentivized to give up its nuclear capability. Or, a more complex policy might create different rules for different states. North Korea might be deterred differently from Pakistan, for example. The advantage to such differences is largely moral: creating different thresholds for the use of a devastating response allows one to take civilian populations, the nature of a given regime, and other considerations into account more clearly on a case by case basis. But the disadvantage is strategic in nature: any system which has differences in how it treats similar actors is open to abuse because enemies can find ways of using such seams against the system’s guarantor. Allied Assurance and Defense From a defensive perspective, how might a nuclear attack in a less-developed state affect that state? Would it be worse, not as bad, or merely different? For example, a less-developed economy is less interconnected, meaning that an attack on a key node might not shock the entire system as in our own country. At the same time, if governance is weaker, or if quality healthcare is less prevalent, it seems such an attack could easily collapse a less developed state. Considering such consequences would be useful in developing rehabilitation strategies should such a nightmare occur. National Defense How might our critical infrastructure be protected today? One classic aphorism about defense planning of any kind is the idea that “one can’t be strong everywhere.” For example, it seems that our containerized and bulk cargo supply chains are extremely concentrated in several key ports – in other words, there are “single points of failure” in our supply chain systems. New ports can’t be created overnight, but if the entry of cargo into the US were very decentralized, it might mean that a nuclear blast would have less of a catastrophic effect on the economy; at the same time, it might be easier for nuclear devices disguised as cargo to enter the country. How does a homeland security planner deal with such paradoxes? Or should he? Should the private sector instead develop as it will? Such questions are no doubt on the minds of many. Perhaps it’s time to start a national conversation about them. Josh Manchester is a Marine veteran of the Iraq campaign. His blog is The Adventures of Chester. ——— Comments (19)rocketsbrain :James :Terry Crane :Interesting. Say if France becomes really pro-Jihad and send a couple of their N-subs to US shores, or trades a nuke for a break in those riots - will US President have guts to retaliate against Paris? watchingfromLA :So what would a potential bomber have to do to deter us from attacking them after an incident like Long Beach? Perhaps having more than one nuke already here would suffice? Has that been 'gamed'? Sean :My guess is the Chinese Military front company running the port already has nukes in the country. Mister Snitch! :A shipping container is just how it would go down, too. We import so much stuff these days, no one can keep track of it all - and the ships they arrive in are only getting bigger! The goods all need to have radio tags slapped on them when they go in, and the containers need to be collapsible, to insure nothing remains behind. This can be done, it just hasn't been, so far. This would only close one loophole, but it's an enormous one. John :While Long Beach might be more devastating economically, a bomb in San Diego harbor could take out 4 nuclear powered carriers. That would reduce any option to respond. It is cheaper to have multiple carriers at one location and easier to defend against conventional attack, but a tempting target for a nuke. I am not sure that the navy remembers Pearl Harbor. SDN :Terry, remember in WWII when the French surrendered, and the British made a considered judgement that the Germans could not be allowed to gain control of the French fleet. The Royal Navy sank or crippled most of the French Navy. I suspect that the operational orders for destroying the French N-sub capablilty are already in the safes of every Los Angeles class sub we have. Mister Snitch! :John's proving the old adage: 'Generals always fight the last war.' John, if we're attacked by terrorists - who, exactly, do we sic the carriers on? Tom Holsinger :This issue has been studied in the civil defense community for many years. I've been published in the Journal of Civil Defense. The best defense here is to get them first. The euphemism for this developed during Clinton's first term was "deterrence by denial". Sean :John - If we are resolved that our response will be the annihilation of all those on the hit-list (ie: the Muslim world)the loss of four carriers is irrelevent. The boomers will have done the job long before they could even work up steam. John Moore :"rocketsbrain's" dirty-bomb alternative is actually pretty hard to do. Getting enough highly radioactive material, delivering it to the upwind site (such as Long Beach) and then dispersing it well isn't going to be easy. One reason the Long Beach scenario is so destructive is the enormous amount of highly radioactive nuclides released by an atomic blast and deposited due to the nucleation and absorption from the lifted cloud of dust. Also, the nuclear explosive, unlike the RDD, is not very radioactive until after it is detonated - it is not dangerous to handle and is hard to detect radiologically (especially a U-235 device). ... The question of deterrence in the event of a nuke with "no return address" is a terrible problem - especially if one or more of the suspect states has significant nuclear capability. I have long wondered if the US has taken appropriate steps in creating strategic threat and uncertainty among the dangerous states. France has done so, announcing twice that a major terrorist attack (not necessarily nuclear) would be met with a nuclear response. Troy :If they can get it in a port in a container, they can probably arrange for it to be shipped too. Imagine, instead, a nuke shipped into New York City and moved by way of those lovely multimode trailers into the center of NY. Everything moved into a port goes out by either another ship or by truck and rail, and often without the container even being opened. Just lifted out and placed on a rail car or trailer bed. The most populated area of LA would work too. You'd see MUCH more than 60,000 casualties. John McDermott :Oh, for the good old days when neither we nor the USSR wanted mutual destruction. These guys nowadays prefer to die. Probably the only way to deal with it is make sure they get their wish, but at the time of our choosing. Lawrence :I wouldn't be so sure that terrorists would try to slip a nuke into this country via a maritime cargo shipping container. Sure this has received a lot of air time, but there are also plenty of risks to the terrorists of being discovered far from U.S. shores. (You don't think the good guys have been gazing at their navel these last few years do you?) There's also the problem of losing control of your nuke - unless you decided to climb into the container to baby sit it. An equally likely pathway for smuggling a nuke into CONUS is a sea-going yacht. There are plenty of yachts around the world and they can land at virtually any U.S. port. This is different than 40' cargo containers that must depart from a foreign container port (where good guys have also been at work) and then land at a container port in the U.S. There is also little attention paid to pleasure boats entering the U.S. (unless suspected of smuggling drugs) or who owns then or where they departed. So, as long as terrorist doesn't plan on smuggling drugs and a nuke on the same trip, he might just be free to sail his yacht right into a U.S. port quite unnoticed. This is just more reason to be concerned about all ships coming into the U.S. and not just container ships. dcpi :The New York City scenario is less likely if you mean Manhattan. Containers sent to New York typically go through Elizabeth, New Jersey (and sometimes Brooklyn). There is no container unloading in Manhattan. Also, tractor trailers are checked by police at the bridges and tunnels. Though the city will not comment on it, they are also checked for radiation at that point. While it could be possible to get a dirty bomb off in one of the outer boroughs, it would not have the same impact. The simplier way to get a dirty bomb into Manhattan (as Cory Lidle demonstrated) would be to fly it in. Will :To be fair, the "Hit List" would currently list only a single islamic nation on it -- Pakistan, and would later add Iran should they continue with their program. And that's the entire point. No longer could a state "hide" behind an act by a non-state entity. If nuclear material (which implicitly is State manufactured) is used in ANY attack, by ANY agency, then that State is held liable and retaliated against. So, if AQ sneaks in to NK, and manages to STEAL a nuclear weapon, and then sets it off in Long Beach, NK gets obliterated in a series of bright flashes on some cold, winter morning. NK "let" the nuke be stolen. They didn't provide enough checks and balances and security to prevent it from being stolen. Now, how this policy would apply against, say, the Ukraine or Russia is anyone's guess. opendna :Hm. This old report is making the rounds again, eh? For your consideration, I offer this editorial from Long Beach Politics.org (which habitually writes about POLB/LA): PT, DC Miss the Mark on "Port Security". Good news: Freelancers Patrol SF Bay With DIY Nuke Detector Bad news: GOP Cuts PoLA/LB Security Funding 50%, Port of Oakland Gets Bupkis. That might be because the Ports are represented by Rep Rohrabacher on Dubai Ports. Worse news: The LNG debate Is it possible for news to get any worse than this: MA LNG Facility Intruders Unnoticed for 5 Days In short: this was a silly study commissioned for political purposes to reinforce the President's impotent WMD talking points. While DC and East Coast think tanks try to scare us with threats of dirty bombs in POLB/LA, they force the construction of an insecure LNG storage facility (with the energy potential of a nuke) in the middile of those very ports... against the will of the population, of course. Meanwhile, port security is used as pork for Republican districts with barge docks on the Mississippi while the ports which actually import stuff have their funding cut. The question I put to you: Is this standard procedure for the Republican Party post-1996? Demosophist :Wouldn't a nuclear weapon from the third world tend to emit a lot of signature radiation? Do we have sniffers out and about, or is there some sort of satellite technology that could detect such a thing? I gather that we can't detect current nukes because they're deep underground, but would this be the case if it were packaged on a surface ship? Just asking. Comments have been archived for this page. |
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Think Dirty Bomb!
Here's another thought and a lot easier to do.
AQ or other Islamofascist terror cells slip over US Southern Border into Southern California with the components for a dirty bomb.
Other cell members take truck driver training at any one of the many truck terminals in the area. Obtain shipping container from the area e.g. Riverside/San Bernardino Counties.
Drive the container into the Port of Long Beach and detonate it in the port. The economic impact of such an attack on the US would be $40 BILLON dollars.
RBT
Oct 24, 2006 08:34 PM